The Athens Convention and Limitation of Liability in U.S. Federal Courts: While Communication Is Key, Some Things are Better Left Unsaid by Boutwell, Angelica L.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
7-1-2012
The Athens Convention and Limitation of Liability
in U.S. Federal Courts: While Communication Is
Key, Some Things are Better Left Unsaid
Angelica L. Boutwell
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Law of the Sea Commons, and the Transportation Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Angelica L. Boutwell, The Athens Convention and Limitation of Liability in U.S. Federal Courts: While Communication Is Key, Some Things
are Better Left Unsaid, 43 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 523 (2012)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol43/iss3/5
523
NOTES
The Athens Convention and Limitation of
Liability in U.S. Federal Courts: While
Communication Is Key, Some Things
are Better Left Unsaid
Angelica L. Boutwell'
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 523
11. THE VARIOUS VERSIONS OF THE ATHENS
CONVENTION .......................................... 528 R
A. Adoption and Ratification of the 1974
Convention ................................. 528 R
B. Protocols of 1976 and 1990 .................... 529 R
C. 2002 Protocol ............................... 529 R
D. Issues Surrounding Liability Limits Pursuant to
the Athens Convention ....................... 532 R
111. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTS SUBJECT TO THE
ATHENS CONVENTION ................................ 534 R
A. Overview of historical development of limitation
of ship owners' liability ....................... 534 R
B. U.S. federal court rulings on Athens Convention
limitations of liability ........................ 537 R
IV. AFTER WAJNSTAT- POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF AN
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMANCE ...................... 549 R
A. Recommendations........................... 551 R
1. Eliminate reference to the Athens Convention
in passage contracts .......................... 551 R
2. Remove references to U.S. law from
limitation of liability provisions .............. 553 R
3. Proposed language for more enforceable
liability limiting provisions ................... 556 R
V. CONCLUSION .......................................... 560 R
1. J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2008,
University of Miami. I would like to thank Professor Michael Sevel for his guidance,
expertise, and insight throughout this process, my parents for their faith and endless
encouragement, my colleagues on the Inter-American Law Review, and my dear
friend, Zach Vosseler, without whom I would lack perspective and a sense of humor.
524 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:3
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps since the birth of economic markets, entities seeking
to engage in trade have sought to limit their liability to third par-
ties.2 The desire for legal limitations of liability in the context of
business transactions grew in prominence as industrial commerce
became increasingly international in nature.3 In the admiralty
and maritime context, the ability of shipping companies and carri-
ers to limit their liability to clients and passengers is deeply
entrenched in the legal systems of ship-owning nations.4 Not to be
outdone, United States law contains provisions for such limits on
ship owners' liability.
It is important to note that any maritime limits of liability
allowable under United States law are restricted in scope to voy-
ages that in some way make contact with a port of the United
States.6 Ambitious multinational treaties have arisen on the
international landscape as the prime arbiters in pursuit of the
goal of legal uniformity in the area of liability limitation. This
article will focus on the emergence of one such convention in par-
ticular: the Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers
and Their Luggage by Sea, colloquially referred to as the "Athens
Convention."'
With its first ratification in 1974, the Athens Convention
made certain limitations of liability available to any ship flying
2. Limitation of liability, generally, has been traced back to the eleventh century
notion of the contrat de commande, a commercial device that allowed merchants to
limit their liability in trade transactions to the value of the goods to be exchanged in
that transaction. Note, Limitation of the Liability of Shipowners, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
246, 247 n.1 (1935).
3. As Mediterranean trade routes expanded during the fourteenth century, ship-
owners were faced with burgeoning costs, higher risk of loss, and less control over the
actions of the captains and crews manning their vessels. From these conditions arose
the concurrent need to relieve ship-owners of liability for full damages for injuries
resulting from employee misconduct beyond the scope of their supervision or control.
Id. at 246.
4. See The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 126 (1894) ("H]owever the practice
originated, it appears, by the end of the seventeenth century, to have become firmly
established among the leading maritime nations of Europe.
5. See generally 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30511 (2006).
6. 46 U.S.C. § 30509(a)(1) (2006) (providing that "[t]he owner, master, manager,
or agent of a vessel transporting passengers between ports in the United States, or
between a port in the United States and a port in a foreign country, may not include
in a regulation or contract a provision limiting. . .(A) the liability of the owner. . .for
personal injury or death caused by the negligence or fault of the owner. . .").
7. See Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their
Luggage by Sea, Dec. 13, 1974, 14 I.L.M. 945 [hereinafter Athens Convention].
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the flag of a signatory nation.' The Athens Convention carries no
legal force of its own in any court of the United States, because the
U.S. is not a signatory to the Convention.' However, several pas-
senger cruise lines have incorporated, by reference, limitations of
liability based on the Athens Convention in their ticket passage
contracts. The terms that refer to the Athens Convention are
incorporated into contract clauses applicable only to foreign
voyages. 0
Passenger carriers in the United States have long been able
to limit the legal rights of passengers by way of terms and condi-
tions incorporated into ticket contracts, provided those terms sat-
isfy reasonable notice requirements in their communication to
passengers." Prime examples of these sorts of limitations are
forum-selection and choice of law clauses. 12 A number of cruise
companies have sought enforcement of Athens Convention liabil-
ity limits in United States federal courts against passengers
claiming injury on cruises that made no contact with a U.S. port
and have argued that terms validly incorporated into a legitimate
contract are enforceable so long as they are reasonably communi-
cated to affected passengers,. 'I A greater number of major interna-
tional cruise companies have incorporated limitation of liability
provisions that invoke specific terms of the Athens Convention
applicable to wholly non-U.S. cruises into their passage
8. Id.
9. See Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions, Inc., 123 F.3d 1287, 1296 (9th Cir. 1997).
10. Meaning any cruise between the ports of two foreign nations, as 46 U.S.C.
§ 30509 prohibits the enforcement by U.S. courts of liability limiting provisions
inserted into passenger carriers' ticket contracts.
11. See generally Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722 F.2d 861 (1st Cir. 1983).
12. A forum selection clause in any contract designates a particular state or court
as the jurisdiction in which the parties will litigate disputes arising out of the contract
and/or their contractual relationship. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 259 (2012). Such
clauses are prima facie valid unless a passenger shows insufficient notice of the
clause's existence in the contract, or the clause is fundamentally unfair. 70 AM. JUR.
2D Shipping § 545 (2012).
A choice of law clause in a contract names a particular state and provides that the
substantial laws of that jurisdiction will be used to determine the validity and
construction of the contract, regardless of any conflicts between the laws of the named
state and the state in which the case is litigated. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 261
(2012).
13. See Becantinos v. Cunard Line Ltd., No. 89 Civ. 0166, 1991 WL 64187
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1991); Mills v. Renaissance Cruises, Inc., No. C 91 3001 BAC ARB,
1992 WL 471301 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 1992); Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d
827 (9th Cir. 2002); Ginsberg v. Silversea Cruises Ltd., No. 03-62141-CIV, 2005 WL
5654644 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2005); Henson v. Seabourn Cruise Line Ltd., Inc., 410
F.Supp. 2d 1246 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
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contracts. 4
While the United States Supreme Court has not had the occa-
sion to rule on the legitimacy of incorporation of the Athens Con-
vention into ticket contracts for cruises having no connection to
the United States save a forum selection clause, there does exist
precedent within the Ninth Circuit.15 More recently, this issue
was explored by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida in a case that was ultimately denied interlocu-
tory appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 6
The strength of limitation of liability provisions that invoke
the Athens Convention should be of preeminent importance to the
cruise lines that utilize them, as it appears that federal courts
14. At the time of this writing, this group of major cruise companies, most with
operations within the United States, includes (but is not limited to): Passenger Ticket
Contract, OCEANIA CRUISES, http://www.oceaniacruises.com/corporatelegal/ticketcont
ract.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2012); Cruise/ Cruisetour Ticket Contract, ROYAL
CARIBBEAN CRUISE LINES, http://www.royalcaribbean.com/customersupport/faq/de
tails.do?pagename=frequently-asked questions&pnav=5&pnav=2&faqSubjectName
=After+You+Purchase&faqld=1079&faqSubjectld=323&faqType=faq/content/enUS/
pdf/CTCNotForBR.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2012); Ticket Contract, CARNIVAL
CRUISE LINES, http://www.carnival.com/cms/static-templates/ticket-contract.aspx
(last visited Mar. 29, 2012); Guest Ticket Contract, NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINES, http://
www2.ncl.com/about/additional-terms-and-conditions#applicable (last visited Mar.
29, 2012); Passage Contract, PRINCESS CRUISES, http://www.princess.com/legal/
passage-contract/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 29, 2012); Cruise/ Cruisetour Ticket
Contract, CELEBRITY CRUISES LTD., http://media.celebritycruises.com/celebrity/
content/pdf/Celebrity CTC Eff 08 01 10.pdf (last visited March 29, 2012); Cruise
Ticket Contract, COSTA CRUISES, http://www.costacruise.com/B2C/JSA/Support/
contract/contract.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2012); Cruise Contract, DISNEY CRUISE
LINE, http://disneycruise.disney.go.com/cruise-contract/?country=us (last visited Mar.
29, 2012); Cruise Contract, HOLLAND AMERICA LINE, http://www.hollandamerica.con
legalAndPrivacy/Main.action?tabName=Cruise+Contract (last visited Mar. 29, 2012);
Cruise Contract, SEABOURN, http://www.seabourn.com/legalAndPrivacy/Main. action?
tabName=Cruise+Contract (last visited Mar. 29, 2012); Passenger Contract Terms &
Conditions, SILVERSEA, http://www.silversea.com/terms-conditions/passage-contract/
(last visited Mar. 29, 2012); Terms and Conditions, STAR CRUISES, http://www.
starcruises.com/media/232935/tncAP_20090622.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2012);
REGENT SEVEN SEAS CRUISES, http://www.rssc.com/legal/terms.aspx (last visited Mar.
29, 2012); Ticket Contract, PAUL GAUGUIN CRUISES, http://www.pgcruises.com/ticket-
contract (last visited Mar. 29, 2012); Terms and Conditions, MSC CRUISES, http://
www.msccruisesusa.com/us-en/Terms-and-Conditions.aspx (last visited Mar. 29,
2012); Terms & Conditions of Carriage, LOUIS CRUISES, http://louiscruises.com/en/
terms-a-conditions-of-carriage (last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
15. See Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2002).
16. See Wajnstat v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., No. 09-21850-CIV-COOKE/TURNOFF
(S.D. Fla. July 12, 2011) (order denying defendant's motion for partial summary
judgment) [hereinafter Wajnstat Summary Judgment Denial]; see also Wajnstat v.
Oceania Cruises, Inc., No. 11-13670 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011); Wajnstat v. Oceania
Cruises, Inc., 684 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2012).
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more closely examine such terms. 7 This closer scrutiny may be
based on a growing hostility toward passenger cruise companies'
attempts to limit their liability to aggrieved passengers, or suspi-
cion of foreign corporations generally. Invoking the liability limi-
tation allowed under the earliest versions of the Athens
Convention against passengers injured on wholly-foreign cruises
may seem like a legitimate way for foreign cruise lines to sidestep
federal law prohibiting the practice. However, this article will
attempt to demonstrate that passage contracts that invoke the
Athens Convention in this way stand to render these liability lim-
iting provisions unenforceable in U.S. federal courts.
Part II of this article examines and explains the various ver-
sions of the Athens Convention in existence, focusing on the differ-
ences between its first ratification and subsequent amendments
and protocols. Part III details the historic and current state of
passenger carrier limitation of liability within the United States
legal system, and moves on to examine judicial opinions where a
limitation of liability based in the Athens Convention was at
issue. Part IV focuses on the emergence of litigation over the
enforceability of Athens Convention liability limiting provisions in
passage contracts within the jurisdiction of the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, and discusses the potential impact of an Elev-
enth Circuit decision affirming the unenforceability of liability
limiting language used widely by foreign cruise lines operating in
the United States. This portion of the article concludes with rec-
ommendations for how foreign cruise lines might increase the
enforceability of their liability limits in the United States court
system.
17. This point is perhaps best evidenced by noting the ever narrowing of the
second prong of the reasonable communicativeness analysis employed by federal
courts when construing contract provisions that explicitly favor the cruise line.
Compare Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722 F.2d 861, 866 (1st Cir. 1983)
(articulating the reasonable communicativeness test as requiring a case-by-case
examination "not only of the ticket itself, but also of any extrinsic factors indicating
the passenger's ability to become meaningfully informed of the contractual terms at
stake"), with Wallis v. Princess Cruises, 306 F.3d 827, 837 (9th Cir. 2002)
(characterizing a disincentive "to study the provisions of [a] ticket" as an extrinsic
factor impeding "the passenger's ability to become meaningfully informed" as
required under Shankles), and Wajnstat Summary Judgment Denial, supra note 16
(suggesting generally that any provision asserted in a cruise passage contract that
contains no additional explanation where a passenger may reasonably be said to
require legal knowledge or sophistication to understand the term is likely not
reasonably communicative under Shankles).
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II. THE VARIOUS ITERATIONS OF THE ATHENS CONVENTION
A. Adoption and Ratification of the 1974 Convention
The Athens Convention was first adopted during a conference
held in Athens, Greece, in 1974." The Convention, as originally
enacted, sought to set out parameters within which carriers could
limit their liability to passengers for loss or damage to luggage, as
well as for personal injury, illness, or death.'9 Article 6 of the Con-
vention, located immediately before the provision containing the
limitation on carrier liability, allows carriers to exonerate them-
selves completely of any and all liability for any loss of or damage
to luggage, and/or death or injury of a passenger if the carrier can
prove that the damage or loss was in some way due to the fault,
either total or contributory, of the passenger.2 0 Article 7 of the
1974 Convention provides that the liability of a carrier for the
death of or personal injury to a passenger will in no case exceed
700,000 francs (or approximately $139,000.00) per carriage.2 1 Arti-
cle 7 also allows any signatory to the 1974 Convention. to impose a
higher limit on carriers' liability.2 2 Interestingly, Article 13 of the
1974 Convention precludes carriers from availing themselves of
the liability limit contained in Article 7 if it is found that "the
damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier done with
the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly with the knowledge
that such damage would probably result."2 3 The succeeding arti-
cles provide procedures by which claims may be made against car-
riers, including notice of claims and time bar provisions, and
provide for matters outside the scope of this article.24 These types
of contractual terms set out procedures that allow passengers to
bring claims against a cruise line, usually by requiring that a pas-
senger provide the carrier with notice before filing, and that both
the notification of intent to file suit and the formal complaint be
filed within a specified period of time.25
18. Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by
Sea, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION (Nov. 6, 2011, 8:17 PM), http://www.
imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Athens-Convention-relating-to-
the-Carriage-of-Passengers-and-their-Luggage-by-Sea-(PAL).aspx
19. See Athens Convention supra note 7.
20. Id. at art. 6.
21. Id. at art. 7.
22. Id.
23. Id. at art. 13.
24. Id. at art. 14-28.
25. Id.
528
THE ATHENS CONVENTION
B. Protocols of 1976 and 1990
Despite the goals of the 1974 Convention, only ten nations
signed and ratified it.26 The United States was not among those
nations. The 1974 Convention entered into force on April 28,
1987.27 The Convention was subsequently amended by protocol in
1976, wherein the monetary unit used to limit carrier liability in
Article 13 was changed to the Special Drawing Right (SDR)."
Article 2 of the 1976 protocol limited carrier liability in the event
of death of or personal injury to a passenger to 46,666 SDRs per
29carriage.
Another protocol to the Convention was attempted in 1990.30
The protocol of 1990 sought to increase the liability limits of the
original Convention, but never entered into force as it was super-
seded by the protocol of 2002.31 Up to the point when the 2002
protocol was proposed, the Convention's limitation regime had
been incorporated, in some instances with higher limits, into the
laws of nations including: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, and Vietnam.32
C. 2002 Protocol
From October 28, 2002, to November 1, 2002, the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization held a conference in London to dis-
cuss a draft protocol to the Convention.33 In light of the fact that
the liability limits provided by the original Convention are gener-
26. The signatories to the 1974 Convention were Argentina, the Bahamas, the
German Democratic Republic, Liberia, Poland, Spain, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR), the United Kingdom (UK), Tonga, and Yemen. Athens Convention
Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, Dec. 13, 1974, 1463
U.N.T.S. 19.
27. Athens Convention, supra note 7.
28. Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by
Sea, supra note 18. The International Monetary Fund defines SDRs as international
units of account which the organization converts daily into the currencies of various
nations, including U.S. dollars. See Special Drawing Rights Factsheet, INT'L
MONETARY FUND [IMF], (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.
htm; see also 6-II Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No. 2-3 (Frank L. Wiswall, Jr. ed., 7th
ed. 2010).
29. Athens Convention, supra note 7, art. 2.
30. Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by
Sea, supra note 18.
31. Id.
32. Baris Soyer, Sundry Considerations on the Draft Protocol to the Athens
Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea 1974, 33
J. MAR. L. & CoM. 519, 519 n.1 (2002).
33. Id. at 519.
2012] 529
530 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:3
ally regarded as too low, one of the main objectives of the 2002
protocol was to increase the caps.34 In addition to raising the limi-
tation of liability provided by the Convention, the 2002 protocol
introduces compulsory insurance into the liability scheme. 35 The
2002 protocol also replaces the fault-based liability system
imposed on carriers by earlier versions of the Convention with a
strict liability regime for shipping-related incidents, personal
injury and death claims.36 Carriers under the rubric of the 2002
protocol must maintain adequate insurance to cover the height-
ened limit of strict liability per carriage for both shipping-related
incidents and death of or personal injury to passengers.3 7
The limits of liability were raised substantially under this
most recent protocol.38 The limit of the carrier to individual pas-
sengers in the event of injury or death is now 250,000 SDRs per
incident. 39 The carrier is now liable unless it can prove the injury
or death resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insur-
rection, or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and
irresistible character, or was wholly caused by an act or omission
done with the intent to cause the injury by a third party.4 0 Addi-
tionally, if the loss to the passenger(s) exceeds the limit allowed by
the 2002 protocol, the carrier is still liable up to a maximum of
400,000 SDRs unless it can prove that the injury or death was in
no way due to its fault or neglect.4 1
34. Id. at 531 (noting that one of the objectives of the 2002 Protocol was to raise
the limits allowable under the Convention to a level acceptable to states, ship-owners,
and the public). Nations that were party to the drafting process struggled to reach a
compromise as they had to strike a balance between resistance to higher caps by P&I
clubs, which provide mutual insurance cover for shipping vessels and passenger
ships, and the interests of nations with strong ties to maritime industry. According to
Soyer's report on the events surrounding the drafting of the 2002 Protocol, maritime
associations in countries such as Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy and
Slovenia all pushed to retain the limits contained in the 1990 Protocol. Nations such
as the United Kingdom and Sweden, on the other hand, pushed for a limit of 300,000
SDR - a figure considerably higher than the 250,000 SDR proposed in the draft
protocol. Id. at 532.
35. Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by
Sea, supra note 18.
36. Id.
37. Id. at art. 4.
38. This constitutes an approximately 500% increase from the 46,666 SDR limit
provided by the 1976 Protocol to the 250,000 SDR limit contained in the 2002
Protocol. Compare Athens Convention, supra note 7 with, Athens Convention relating
to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, supra note 18.
39. Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by
Sea, supra note 18.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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An "opt-out" clause is also included in the 2002 protocol which
would allow states that are party to the Convention to provide, by
specific national laws, different limitations of liability for carriers
to passengers so long as any adopted national limit is not lower
than that prescribed by the Protocol.42 Finally, the 2002 protocol
creates a procedure designed to increase the ease with which
heightened limits on carrier liability may be adopted by signatory
nations.4 3 States that adopt the 2002 protocol must also abandon
the terms of the 1974 Convention.4 4 At the time of this writing the
2002 protocol to the Convention has not yet entered into force.45
Although the refusal of the United States to ratify the 1974
Convention and any of the ensuing protocols and amendments
hinders international efforts toward uniformity in this area of the
law, it does not mean that the Convention bears no consequences
for American passengers. 46 As will be further discussed in later
sections, limitations of liability based on the Convention may be
enforced in American courts when incorporated by express refer-
ence in a cruise line's passage contract, so long as the cruise to
which the provision applies does not come in contact with any port
of the United States.47 As a great majority of international cruise
passengers are American citizens,4 8 Americans, as parties to con-
tracts that incorporate the Convention, are as likely to be sub-
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Harry Duintjer Tebbens, The European Union and the Athens Convention on
Maritime Carriers' Liability for Passengers in Case of Accidents: An Incorporation
Adventure, 61 RHDI 653, 655 (2008).
45. Id.
46. Soyer, supra note 33, at 541.
47. Id. at 540. For example, a passenger injured on a cruise from Spain to Italy
could face limitation of his or her recovery by way of a valid incorporation of a
limitation under the Athens Convention in their contract of passage. If the same
passenger were injured on a cruise between Fort Lauderdale, Florida and New
Orleans, Louisiana, no such limitation would be enforceable in a federal court of the
United States. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. Silversea Cruises Ltd., No. 03-62141-CIV, 2005
WL 5654644 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2005) (denying cruise line's motion for summary
judgment seeking to limit its liability to a passenger pursuant to the Athens
Convention where the passenger was injured on a cruise between Fort Lauderdale,
Florida and New Orleans, Louisiana).
48. Based on current figures, approximately 15 million passengers embarked on a
cruise in 2010. Approximately 11 million of those passengers were North American,
with about 93% of that figure comprising U.S. passengers. The Overview: 2011 CLIA
Cruise Market Overview, CRUISE LINES INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, INC., (2011) ,
http://www.cruising.org/sites/default/files/misc/2011FINALOV.pdf. See also Cruise
Industry Overview - 2011,FLORIDA-CARIBBEAN CRUISE ASSOCIATION, http://www.f-
cca.com/downloads/2011-overviewbook Cruise%20Industry%200verview%20and%20
Statistics.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2012).
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jected to the liability limitation provided therein as if the U.S. had
ratified the Convention. That is not to say, however, that there
are not potential obstacles in the way of enforcing such limits
against cruise passengers in federal courts of the United States.
D. Issues Surrounding Liability Limits Pursuant to
the Athens Convention
With uniformity of ship owner liability as the main goal for
negotiating nations, a number of international conventions exist
that regulate the extent to which ship owners can limit their lia-
bility in a wide range of circumstances.4 9 As suggested by the
amounts set out by the 2002 protocol to the Athens Convention,
the trend has been toward heightened liability caps for shippers
and passenger carriers.o While passenger safety and property
interests are undoubtedly of prime concern to international
lawmakers, efforts to draft and ratify instruments like the Athens
Convention are undertaken to reconcile the tension between those
concerns and the need to provide shippers and passenger carriers
with predictability for insurance purposes."' Though ratification
of the 2002 protocol to the Athens Convention faces many obsta-
cles, perhaps chief among these obstacles is the increased burden
it places on shippers and carriers to obtain appropriate liability
insurance under the protocol.52 The increased potential maximum
loss to a cruise company under the liability regime of the 2002
Convention makes it very possible that insurance providers will
refuse to provide the necessary coverage.53
Doubtless, each amendment or protocol to the Convention
was initiated not only to gain accession of the majority of con-
cerned nations, but particularly with the hope that the United
49. See Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, Nov. 19, 1976,
1456 U.N.T.S. 221; Protocol to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, Nov. 19, 1976,1225 U.N.T.S. 355.
50. Soaring hikes in liability limits a growing industry concern, LLOYD'S LIST
(October 31, 2005), http://www.lloydslist.com/11/sector/Insurance/articlelO7845.ece.
51. See Soyer, supra note 33, at 537. Liability regimes traditionally serve two
purposes: compensation and deterrence. See Muhammad Masum Billah, Economic
Analysis of Limitation of Shipowners' Liability, 19 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 297 (2006-2007).
While compensation is definitely the more dominant purpose, according to Billah, the
main problem with limitation of liability regimes is under-deterrence of ship owners.
Id at 307. Increased caps on allowable ship owner limitations of liability, therefore,
work to increase the overall deterrence affected by liability regimes contained in
international conventions like the Athens Convention. Id.
52. See Soyer, supra note 33, at 540.
53. Id.
532
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States would finally ratify. However, according to a position
paper written on behalf of the Maritime Law Association of the
United States, the approach taken by the 2002 protocol is funda-
mentally at odds with current U.S. law and practice and "not justi-
fiably so." 54
The MLA primarily took issue with the liability regime pro-
posed by the protocol. The MLA opposed the "reverse burden of
proof' imposed by the protocol to shipping incidents, personal
injury, and death claims, as well as the imposition of strict liabil-
ity for passenger injury claims.5 5 The MLA argued that strict lia-
bility was developed to (a) address the heightened risk of ultra-
hazardous activities that pose harm so serious to the public that it
is appropriate to place the risk of loss on the entity engaging in
the activities; or (b) to spread risks from consumers to profit mak-
ing industries, like the manufacturers of defective products.56
According to the MLA, "[t]he operation of a cruise ship by a com-
petent master with competent officers and crew exercising reason-
able care is not an inherently dangerous or ultra-hazardous
activity which should give rise to strict liability."" Furthermore,
the MLA argued, the cruise industry does not provide a product,
but a service, and the relationship between the carrier and the
passenger is different from that of a manufacturer and the pur-
chaser of its goods."8
As neither the U.S., nor many other nations, have adopted the
2002 protocol, it seems safe to say that the Convention has a long
way to go toward widespread adoption and ratification. In light of
the international shift toward higher potential payouts in dam-
ages to injured passengers, international cruise lines seek to both
avail themselves of the lowest available liability limits, while
54. William R. Dorsey, III, Position Paper on the Proposed Protocol to the 1974
Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea,
MARITIME LAw ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES (July 16, 2001), http://mlaus.org/
article.ihtml?id=604&folder+103.
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 3. Strict liability is a theory of liability typically applied to hold a
manufacturer responsible for defects in its products. Strict liability law, overall, is
based on the notion that the cost of physical injury or property damage to an
individual may be monumental, but it is one that the producer or manufacturer can
insure against. 72A C.J.S. Products Liability § 7 (2012). The general rule is that
strict product liability does not extend to services. Id. Actions that arise out of
services rendered are typically dealt with under a negligence liability regime, as
negligence law tends to focus on the conduct of the defendant, and strict liability
focuses on the condition of the product. 72A C.J.S. Products Liability § 6 (2012).
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simultaneously defending themselves from passenger claims in
friendly forums." Cruise lines look to United States federal courts
to offer the best of both worlds: the application of well-established
and industry-friendly federal maritime precedent to passenger
complaints, and the opportunity to contract around the applica-
tion of federal statutes that are hostile to the low liability limits
boasted by early versions of the Athens Convention.
III. ENFORCEABILITY OF PASSAGE CONTRACTS SUBJECT TO
THE ATHENS CONVENTION
Despite the United States' refusal to ratify the Athens Con-
vention from its earliest adoption to the present day, injured pas-
sengers who sue in federal courts may still be subject to the
limitations of liability provided in the 1974 Convention. Although
the Convention holds no force of law on its own in the U.S.,6 0 a
significant number of major cruise lines have taken to incorporat-
ing limitation of liability clauses into their passage contracts
based on the provisions of the 1974 Convention.6 1
Pleasure cruise passenger tickets, naturally, seek to stack the
legal deck in the favor of the ship owner. U.S. courts, with little
deviation, seem to more closely scrutinize passenger ticket con-
tract terms that seek to limit a carrier's liability pursuant to the
Athens Convention. This portion of the article will explore rea-
sons for this scrutiny. Part A will first focus on the background of
limitations of liability for ship owners in the American legal sys-
tem generally. Part B will move on to examine the small number
of federal court opinions evaluating the validity of carrier limita-
tions of liability based in the Athens Convention.
A. Overview of historical development of limitation of
ship owners' liability
Before discussing the obstacles that may arise when a cruise
59. As has been stated, contract law is the medium through which cruise lines
work to their greatest legal advantage. Contract law, because it generally calls for
the enforcement of form contracts, allows cruise lines, as the drafters, to design and
construct their own private law system. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality,
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1204
(2003).
60. See, e.g., Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions, Inc., 123 F.3d 1287, 1296 (9th Cir. 1997)
("The United States has not acceded to or ratified the Athens Convention and the
Convention's damage limitations therefore do not apply to actions under United
States maritime law.").
61. See sources cited supra note 14.
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ship company seeks the enforcement of Athens Convention limita-
tion of liability provisions in its passage contract in a U.S. federal
court, it is useful to understand the historical background on the
limitation doctrine itself, and its place in the American legal sys-
tem. Understanding the legal backdrop of limitations of liability
allowed to ship owners under U.S. law helps to illuminate why
foreign cruise companies seek to litigate passenger personal
injury claims in U.S. courts while at the same time seeking to
avoid being subject to U.S. law governing limitations of liability
for ship owners.
Permitting a property owner to limit his liability to the value
of his property has been traced to the Roman legal principle of
noxae deditio, by which an owner could discharge his liability to
another injured by his property by surrendering the property
itself.6 2 The earliest known instance of a ship owner exercising the
right to limit his liability is found in the Amalphitan Table, a com-
mercial code developed in eleventh century Italy.6 3 It was not
until the 18th century that the English Parliament allowed limi-
tation of ship owner liability.64 Parliament was partially moti-
vated by the knowledge that neighboring seafaring nations had
enacted similar laws meant to encourage the development of mari-
time industry through the increased participation of investors and
merchants in shipping and trade.65 Parliament passed another act
in 1813 that provided a limitation of ship owner liability for dam-
ages that resulted from negligence and collision."6 The purposes of
this act were substantially similar to those of the earlier act - to
62. James J. Donovan, The Origins and Development of Limitation of Shipowners'
Liability, 53 TUL. L. REV. 999, 1000 (1979). Though the historical folklore
surrounding the allegedly Roman origins of the doctrine of noxae deditio has since
fallen by the wayside, the principle became engrained in American jurisprudence at
an early date. See The Rebecca, 20 F. Cas. 373 (D. Maine 1831); Sproat v. Donnell, 26
Me. 185 (Me. 1846); The Brig E.A. Barnard, 2 F. 712 (E.D. Pa. 1880); The T.A.
Goddard, 12 F. 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1882); The New York, 93 F. 495 (E.D.N.Y. 1899); The
Hoffmans, 171 F. 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1909).
63. Donovan, supra note 62, at 1001.
64. Id. at 1007 n.55 ("The title of the statute (as cited in a later amended version) is
'An act to settle how far owners of ships shall be answerable for the acts of the masters
or mariners; and for giving further relief to the owners of ships."').
65. Id. at 1008.
66. Id. at 1009; see also, An Act to Limit Responsibility of Ship Owners in Certain
Cases, 1813, 53 Geo. 3 c. 159, which provided, in relevant part:
That no person or persons who is, are or shall be owner or owners of
any ship or vessel, shall be subject or liable to answer for or make
good any loss or damage arising or taking place by reason of any
Act, neglect, matter or thing done, omitted or occasioned without
the fault or privity of such owner or owners, which may happen to
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increase the number of ships in the English fleet and to encourage
merchants and investors.6 7
Massachusetts6' and Maine 69 were the first U.S. states to pro-
vide the privilege of limits on ship owner liability via statute, in
1819 and 1821, respectively.0 After an unfavorable ruling by the
Supreme Court in The New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v.
The Merchants' Bank of Boston (The Lexington)," the maritime
industry lobbied Congress for industry-wide protection in the form
of legislation.72 After much congressional debate, the United
States Limitation Act was passed in 1851, and allowed for liberal
limitation of liability so as to afford the greatest benefit to the ship
owner.7 3 The 1851 Act was unambiguously intended to equalize
the economic position of American ship owners, but also to
encourage investment in shipping.7 4 Though the Act was passed
in order "that the American marine should stand at home and
abroad as well as the English marine,"" what ultimately resulted
was a system that bestowed upon American ship owners greater
economic benefits than their British ship owning counterparts.7 6
The Supreme Court subsequently upheld the Act under both the
Commerce" and Necessary and Proper" Clauses of the U.S.
any goods, wares, merchandise or other things laden or put on
board the same ship or vessel.
67. Donovan, supra note 62, at 1009.
68. An Act to encourage Trade and Navigation within this Commonwealth, 1818
Mass. Acts ch. 0122 (repealed 1902).
69. An Act respecting the willful destruction and casting away of ships and
cargoes; the custody of shipwrecked goods and trade and navigation, 1821 Me. Laws
78, §§ 7-10.
70. Id.
71. The N.J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merch.'s Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. 344 (1848)
(refusing to honor a contractual limitation of ship owner liability).
72. See Donovan, supra note 62, at 1012.
73. Id. at 1018.
74. Id. at 1019.
75. Id. at 1013.
76. Id. at 1027.
77. The text of the Commerce Clause provides that the United States Congress
shall have power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also
Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U.S. 541, 545 (1880) ("The commerce regulated is
expressly confined to a kind over which Congress has been given control.");
Providence & N.Y.S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 589 (1883) ("We have no
doubt that [C]ongress had the power to pass the law. It is only a maritime regulation
in its character, but it is clearly within the scope of the power given to [C]ongress 'to
regulate commerce."').
78. The text of the Necessary and Proper Clause provides that "[t]he Congress
shall have Power - to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the forgoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
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Constitution.
As time went on, however, opponents of the limitation of lia-
bility regime became increasingly dissatisfied with the Act's abil-
ity to greatly hinder the recovery of sometimes catastrophically
injured plaintiffs or their estates. Growing outrage resulted in a
1935 amendment to the Limitation Act wherein Congress
required ship owners to establish minimum limitation funds for
personal injury or death claims of $60 per ton.7 9 A later modifica-
tion to the Act was a section that invalidated contractual stipula-
tions by ship owners that limited the giving of notice period and
institution of suit period for personal injury and death claims to
less than six months and one year.80 Another amendment prohib-
ited passenger carriers from incorporating into their passage con-
tracts any clause that sought to exculpate them from liability for
negligence, provided for liquidated damages, or that limited a
claimant's right to file a complaint in a court of competent
jurisdiction."
Since the latter part of the twentieth century, courts have
exhibited hostility to the Limitation Act specifically, and to limita-
tions of liability by ship owners generally. One reason for this
hostility might be that the conditions in the shipping industry
that induced Congress in 1851 to pass the Limitation Act no
longer exist." Yet despite the ongoing criticism, the Limitation
Act remains in effect.
B. U.S. federal court rulings on Athens Convention
limitations of liability
In the face of an international desire to increase the liability
of ship owners to injured passengers, cruise lines have looked to
passage contract drafting as a safe haven for their economic well-
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Office thereof." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See also Butler v. Boston & S. S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527, 556-57
(1889); Ex parte Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 12 (1891).
79. At the time, the applicable statute was 46 U.S.C. § 183(b), (c) (1976). This
amendment is currently codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30508-09 (2011).
80. 46 U.S.C. § 30508(b).
81. 46 U.S.C. § 30509(a).
82. Kenneth H. Volk & Nicholas H. Cobbs, Admiralty Law Institute: Symposium
on American Law of Collision: Limitation of Liability, 51 TUL. L. REV. 953, 984 (1977)
("Judicial expansion of the Limited Liability Act at this date seems especially
inappropriate. Many of the conditions in the shipping industry which induced the
1851 Congress to pass the Act no longer prevail." (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Cushing,
347 U.S. 409, 437 (Black, J., dissenting))).
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being. 3 Generally, so long as there are no statutes in effect to the
contrary, a contract's terms and conditions are considered binding
when they have been reasonably communicated to passengers.8 4
Therefore, cruise lines take care to draft passage contracts that
work to their greatest advantage, especially when it comes to any
potential liability for incidents occurring on voyages between non-
U.S. ports." This type of legal cherry-picking, considered along-
side a federal judiciary that is increasingly hostile to carriers' abil-
ity to limit their liability to passengers, makes well-drafted
passage contract provisions to limit liability all the more impor-
tant to cruise companies seeking to mitigate damage awards.
By coupling forum-selection clauses that require claimants to
file suit in U.S. federal courts with limitations of liability pursu-
ant to the 1974 Athens Convention, international cruise lines are
able to avail themselves of advantageous U.S. federal maritime
law, while precluding themselves from the strictures of 46 U.S.C.
§ 30509.6 This pursuit of being held subject to the most advanta-
geous laws in the most beneficial forum becomes all the more
interesting - and potentially problematic - in light of the fact that
although 75% of the world's passengers are U.S. citizens, the
majority of cruise ships are registered in countries such as Pan-
ama, Liberia, and the Bahamas. This portion of the article will
examine the federal courts' treatment of contractual limitations of
83. See Korobkin, supra note 59, at 1204.
84. See 14 Am. JUR. 2D Carriers § 1208 (2011).
85. Cruise lines also engage in practices that help to legally insulate them, such as
registering ships in countries with favorable or lax laws, thereby exempting
themselves from disadvantageous laws and regulations. See source cited infra note
162 for discussion of these 'flag-of-convenience' practices.
86. 46 U.S.C. § 30509(a) (2011) provides:
1) "IN GENERAL. The owner .., of a vessel transporting passengers
between ports in the United States, or between a port in the
United States and a port in a foreign country, may not include in
a regulation or contract a provision limiting -
(A) the liability of the owner. . .for personal injury or death
caused by the negligence of the owner ... ; or
(B) the right of a claimant for personal injury or death to a trial
by court of competent jurisdiction."
87. According to the Cruise Lines International Association, the world's largest
cruise association that serves as a non-governmental consultative organization to the
International Maritime Organization, nearly 90% of the commercial vessels that call
on U.S. ports are not registered in the U.S. Even major U.S.-controlled shipping
companies have chosen to register their ships under foreign flags. See Maritime
Industry Background, CRUISE LINES INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.
cruising.org/regulatory/resources/maritime-industry-background (last visited Jan. 3,
2012).
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liability founded in the Athens Convention, with an eye to factors
important to the courts' analyses.
The Majestic (1897)"
One of the earliest and most emblematic cases answering the
question of limitations on ship owner liability pursuant to a pas-
sage contract, The Majestic, involved plaintiffs who traveled via
steamship from Liverpool to New York City in 1892.89 Upon dis-
embarking, the claimants discovered that their luggage had been
damaged by intruding sea water. 90 The complaint, filed in the
Southern District of New York, alleged that the owner of the
Majestic was negligent in the transportation of the claimants'
belongings.9' The ship owner sought to discharge, or at least limit,
its liability by way of a provision contained in the claimants'
ticket.9 2
There was no proof that the claimants had seen, read, or even
knew of the contractual provisions the ship owner sought to
invoke.93 Chief Justice Fuller, deciding in favor of the claimants
held that "when a company desires to impose special and most
stringent terms upon its customers, in exoneration of its own lia-
bility, there is nothing unreasonable in requiring that those terms
shall be distinctly declared and deliberately accepted."94 This case
arguably sowed the seed for the test by which modern courts eval-
88. 17 S. Ct. 597 (1897).
89. Id. at 598.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The provision read:
"3. Neither the Shipowner nor the Passage Broker or Agent is
responsible for loss of or injury to the Passenger or his luggage or
personal effects, or delay on the voyage, arising from steam, latent
defects in the Steamer, her machinery, gear, or fittings, or from act
of God, Queen's enemies, perils of the sea or rivers, restraints of
princes, rulers, and peoples, barratry or negligence in navigation,
of the Steamer or of any other vessel.
4. Neither the Shipowner nor the Passage Broker or Agent is in any
case liable for loss of or injury to or delay in delivery of luggage or
personal effects of the Passenger beyond the amount of £10, unless
the value of the same in excess of that sum be declared at or before
the issue of this Contract Ticket, and freight at current rates for
every kind of property (except pictures, statuary, and valuables of
any description upon which one percent, will be charged) is paid."
Id. at 599.
93. Id. at 602 (finding that the claimants "did not sign [the notices], nor were they
required to do so, nor was it contemplated that they should").
94. Id
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uate the enforceability of ticket provisions in cruise passage con-
tracts: the reasonable communicativeness test.95
Silvestri v. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Vanigazione96
In this case, decided by Judge Henry Friendly, the claimant
sought recovery for an injury sustained as a result of a ship lurch-
ing during transit." The claimant petitioned the Second Circuit to
reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to the
cruise line for the claimant's failure to comply with a provision
contained in his ticket contract.9" One theory of the claimant's
appeal was based on the ruling in The Majestic.99 In his analysis
of the different precedential approaches taken to issues of passen-
ger notice, Judge Friendly found that "the thread that runs
implicitly through the cases sustaining incorporation is that the
steamship line had done all it reasonably could to warn the pas-
senger that the terms and conditions were important matters of
contract affecting his legal rights."'o Judge Friendly further char-
acterized the holding in The Majestic as requiring warnings like
those at issue in this case to be significantly "eye-catching."o1
Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A. 102
Shankles is the case from which most federal courts draw the
reasonable communicativeness test. When an Italian cruise ship,
the Angelina Lauro, was engulfed by flames in the port of St.
Thomas in the U.S. Virgin Islands, most of the personal property
of the passengers and crew was either lost, irreparably damaged,
or subjected to vandalism and looting. 03 As the plaintiff in this
case brought a claim for loss of personal property almost a year
after the casualty, the cruise line sought summary judgment in
the district court on the basis that the ticket contract limited the
95. See Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722 F.2d 861, 864 (1st Cir. 1983) ("The
basic inquiry is whether, and to what extent, a passenger, who in almost all cases
does not actually bargain for a particular term or condition of a contract of passage,
but who nevertheless signs the ticket before embarkation, is bound by the fine print of
the ticket.").
96. Silvestri v. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Vanigazione, 388 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.
1968).
97. Id. at 12.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 13.
100. Id. at 17.
101. Id. at 17-18.
102. 722 F.2d 861, 864 (1st Cir. 1983)
103. Id. at 863.
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period for filing suits to six months, and that the plaintiff had
given it no notice of an intent to sue as required by the contract.'0 4
The district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor
of the cruise line. 105
On appeal, the plaintiffs most compelling argument was that
ticket contract did not reasonably communicate its terms and con-
ditions to passengers.o Guided by the reasoning in The Majestic
and Silvestri,o7 the Shankles court undertook to evaluate whether
the contract terms at issue had been reasonably communicated to
passengers by the cruise line.os
When analyzing whether the physical characteristics of the
ticket supported its terms and conditions being of reasonable com-
municativeness, the court evaluates two facets of the ticket con-
tract. First, the First Circuit here instructs other courts to assess
features like size of typeface, conspicuousness and clarity of notice
on the face of the ticket, and the ease with which a passenger can
read the provisions in question.10 9 Second, courts are required to
look to the circumstances surrounding the passenger's purchase
and subsequent retention of the ticket.o The court here noted
that
[alithough a passenger may almost never read all of the
fine print on the ticket upon purchase, or as pleasure read-
ing in the berth the first night at sea, the same passenger
might very well be expected to consult the multifarious
terms and conditions of the ticket/contract in the event of
an accident resulting in a loss or injury.
104. Id. at 867. The contract provision asserted by the ship owner read as follows:
(1) For property losses, notice of the claim [must] be filed with the
company within 10 days of the loss and suit be commenced not
later than 6 months therefrom.
(2) For personal injuries, notice of the claim be filed within 6
months and suit be commenced within 1 year.
Id. at 863.
105. Id. at 863.
106. Id.
107. In contrast, the Third Circuit in Marek v. Marpan Two, Inc., 817 F.2d 242 (3d
Cir. 1987), commented that the Silvestri test, if taken literally, is too rigid. There is
no "situation where, from hindsight, one could not imagine the shipowner doing some
little bit more to draw attention to the limitation clause . . . . Thus, even though the
courts continue to use the 'all it reasonably could' language, application of the
standard involves notions of reasonableness and not hypothesizing some further step
the shipowner could possibly have taken." Marek, 817 F.2d at 245.
108. Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722 F.2d 861, 864-67 (1st Cir. 1983).
109. Id. at 864.
110. Id. at 865.
111. Id.
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The First Circuit further characterized this second part of the rea-
sonable communicativeness test as requiring courts to analyze
extrinsic factors indicating the passenger's ability to "become
meaningfully informed of the contractual terms at stake."112
Finally, the Shankles court defines the determination of whether
or not a passage contract's terms give reasonable notice to passen-
gers as a question of law for decision by the court."3
Becantinos v. Cunard Line Limited114
The earliest known instance of a U.S. federal court evaluating
the enforceability of a limitation of liability provision pursuant to
the Athens Convention, Becantinos, is a district court case dealing
with an alleged breach of contract, breach of warranty, and negli-
gence action."' The plaintiffs complaint stemmed from damage to
paintings he transported from Europe to the United States for
sale on the defendant's cruise liner. 6
The district court in this case ultimately decided that the Ath-
ens Convention liability limitation, as included in the defendant's
passage contract at the time of the transatlantic voyage, was valid
and enforceable despite the fact that the voyage terminated at a
U.S. port."' Perhaps a justification for the apparently erroneous
decision in Becantinos can be found in the fact that evaluation of
any passage contract term by a court is necessarily a case-by-case
undertaking."' The court in this case seems to have specifically
112. Id. at 866.
113. Id. at 867.
114. No. 89 Civ. 0166, 1991 WL 64187 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1991).
115. Id. at *1.
116. Id.
117. Instead of applying U.S. law, as required under 46 U.S.C. § 30509, the Court
here looks to Article 2 of the Convention and determines that the carriage here was
international in nature, that the ship departed from a state or nation that had ratified
the Convention, and that the ticket contract was purchased in a nation also party to
the Convention. Id. at *1-2.
The court here also determined that cruise line contracts are not contracts of
adhesion, also a misstatement of the law. See Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722
F.2d 861, 863-4 (1st Cir. 1983 ("Beginning ... with the case of The Majestic,... courts
have struggled to divine standards by which to determine whether steamship
passengers are to be held bound by 'boilerplate' conditions located in the fine print of
adhesion contracts of passage."); see also Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions, Inc., 123 F.3d
1287, 1292 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Cruise passenger tickets are contracts of adhesion, and as
such, ambiguities in them must be construed against the carrier." (citing Rams v.
Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Inc., 17 F.3d 11, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1994); Lousararian v.
Royal Caribbean Corp., 951 F.2d 7, 8 (1st Cir. 1991))).
118. See Shankles, 722 F.2d at 866 (articulating the reasonable communicativeness
test as requiring a case-by-case examination "not only of the ticket itself, but also of
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relied on precedent that found the defendant's passage contract
reasonably communicative."' As for the court's discussion of the
Athens Convention, the decision seems to highlight the novelty
inherent in the inclusion of reference to an international legal
instrument like the Convention in a passage contract, and the fed-
eral system's reverence for the protection of the enforceability of
valid contracts.120 In the wake of more recent decisions involving
Athens Convention limitations of liability, Becantinos is some-
what of an anomaly, yet instructive nonetheless in that it demon-
strates the complexity of the issues facing federal courts in the
United States when deciding these sorts of cases.
Mills v. Renaissance Cruises, Inc.12 1
Both parties in this proceeding moved for summary judgment
on whether the passage contract worked to limit plaintiffs recov-
ery against the defendants for negligence. The contested provision
purported to incorporate article 9 of the Athens Convention.122
During a cruise from Spain to Italy, one of the plaintiffs fell and
broke his leg.12 3 The plaintiffs contended that the provision con-
tained in their passage contract invoking a limitation of liability
any extrinsic factors indicating the passenger's ability to become meaningfully
informed of the contractual terms at stake").
119. Becantinos, 1991 WL 64187, at *2 ("[T]he standard to apply to print size in
maritime passage ticket contracts is one of 'reasonable communicativeness' . . . . In a
number of cases, Cunard's Passage Contract has been found to have met this
standard." (citing Angello v. QUEEN ELIZABETH 2, 1987 A.M.C. 1150 (D.C.N.J.
1987); Hecht and Weingarten v. Cunard Line Ltd., 1982 A.M.C. 656 (2d Cir. 1982); De
Nicola v. Cunard Line Ltd., 1981 A.M.C. 1388, 1393 (1st Cir. 1981); Siegelman v.
Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955); Horvath v. Cunard S.S. Co., 103
F. Supp. 356, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co., 235 N.Y. 162 (N.Y.
1923)).
120. Id.
121. Mills v. Renaissance Cruises, Inc., No. C 91-3001 BAC ARB, 1992 WL 471301
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 1992).
122. Id. at *1. The provision at issue stated:
The Carrier shall not be liable for any such ... injury ... except the
negligence of the Carrier or its employees' action within the scope
of their Employment, and if such negligence be proven, the
Carrier's liability therefore shall not exceed the following
limitations per Passenger in Special Drawing Rights (S.D.R.) as
defined in the amendment of 1978 to the Athens Convention,
article 9:
Personal Injury or Death S.D.R. 46,666
The first S.D.R. 13 to be borne by the Passenger according to the
Athens Convention, article 8.
Id.
123. Id.
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for the defendant under the Athens Convention was unenforceable
as a matter of law because it was not reasonably communicated,
the nature of the passage contract as one of adhesion prevented
them from rejecting that, or any other term in the ticket contract,
and that the contract as written violated public policy.124
Interestingly, the district court in this case rejected the plain-
tiffs' claim that the limitation provision was not reasonably com-
municated because it contained no information about the origin of
the Athens Convention, nor did it define the meaning of SDRs or
advise passengers as to where such information could be found.'25
Nevertheless, the district court found that the language provided
by the defendant in its passage contract was sufficient to put
plaintiffs on notice of the liability limitation.12 6 The district court
also determined that mere possession of a ticket contract provides
a passenger with the ability to become meaningfully informed of
the limitation of liability provision contained therein, and whether
or not the passenger actually read the contract was irrelevant.'27
In support of their argument that the liability limiting provi-
sion at issue is void as against public policy, the plaintiffs cited 46
U.S.C. § 30509 (formerly § 183(c)).12 8 The district court, citing to
precedent,1 2 9 refused to "wield the trump of American public pol-
icy," affirming that it "[does] not believe American public policy
reaches the provisions of a contract of passage for an entirely for-
eign voyage . . . . Congress, in Sections [30508 and 30509] delim-
ited the reach of American public policy to contracts of passage for
voyages that touch the United States; [it] refuse [s] to supplement
that Congressional choice with judicial embellishment." 130 As is
probably apparent, the district court in Mills went on to hold that
the passage contract provision at issue was valid and enforceable,
and the court limited the plaintiffs' recovery accordingly.
Considering the forceful language used in the court's discus-
124. Id.
125. Id. at *2. Though the district court in this case did not find it necessary for the
defendant cruise company to provide additional information about the Convention or
SDRs, such omissions by the defendant in Wallis v. Princess Cruises would prove fatal
to that defendant's case. See infra text accompanying notes 142-149.
126. Mills, 1992 WL 771301, at *2.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 3. Though it is apparent that § 30509 was inapplicable to this case
because the subject cruise was entirely foreign, the plaintiffs argued the fact that
Congress enacted the statute indicates a broader public policy, rendering the liability
limitation at issue void. Id.
129. Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri Gestoine, 858 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1988).
130. Mills, 1992 WL 471301, at *3 (citing Hodes, 858 F.2d at 915).
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sion of the applicability of public policy arguments to controver-
sies in cases like these, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
need to decide cases on objective analyses, and not on policy
grounds weighs heavy on the courts' minds.131 That is not to say
that policy does not potentially play a larger role in deciding cases
like Mills. Furthermore, in matters involving international law or
legal actors, it may be that courts, like that in Mills, are hesitant
to blatantly decide on American public policy grounds out of
respect for instruments of international law.13 2
Berman v. Royal Cruise Line, Limited1 33
First and foremost, it is important to point out that this case
was decided by a county court, not a federal court. However, its
analysis of a contract invoking the Athens Convention highlights
the degree to which the law in this area was, and in many ways
still is, unsettled. The cruise in this case began in Venice, Italy,
and ended in Lisbon, Portugal. 134 In upholding the defendant's
Athens Convention-based limitation of liability, the Court in
Berman cited Mills and Becantinos as supporting precedent. 3
Here, as also seen in Becantinos, the court looked to the actual
text of the Athens Convention in determining whether and to
what extent its terms, as incorporated into the defendant's pas-
sage contract, would be enforceable. 13 6 The court in this case held
the fact that the provision seeking to limit the defendant's liability
did not contain any precise number of SDRs was not problematic,
as the Convention itself requires no such notification to passen-
131. The Mills court strongly alluded to this point when it discussed and quoted
Hodes. See id. In Hodes, the court "adamantly refuse[d] to wield the trump of
American public policy," and cited to The Bremen v. Zapata Off Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1,
9 (1972). Hodes, 858 F.2d at 915. When it did so, the Hodes court further stated:
We simply do not believe American public policy reaches the
provisions of a contract of passage for an entirely foreign voyage,
even should the contract be entered into within the United States.
Congress, in Section 30509, delimited the reach of American public
policy to contracts of passage for voyages that touch the United
States; we refuse to supplement that Congressional choice with
judicial embellishment.
Id.
132. Of further interest, and worth noting in Mills, is the court's reference, in a
footnote, to the fact that its ruling as to the ambiguity of the liability limiting
provision at issue before it might have been different had the 1990 Protocol to the
Athens Convention been ratified. Mills, 1992 WL 471301, at *4 n. 7.
133. 1995 A.M.C. 1926 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1995).
134. Id. at 1927.
135. Id. at 1928-29.
136. Id. at 1929.
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gers.137 The court further concluded that it would be impractical
for defendants to state precise dollar amounts for any limitation of
liability under the Athens Convention, as SDR exchange rates are
constantly in flux. 138 This conclusion is in direct conflict with the
Supreme Court's holding in The Majestic, that where a carrier
desires to limit or exonerate itself from liability, it should be
required to do so in terms "distinctly declared and deliberately
accepted."'3 ' Finally, the Berman court opined that were the
defendant to provide in its ticket contract any additional informa-
tion about SDRs, it would add no meaningful information to the
contract. 140
Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc.141
In the realm of validity and enforceability of cruise lines'
attempts to limit their liability to passengers by way of the Athens
Convention, Wallis is the closest thing to controlling precedent.
The plaintiff in this case appealed from a district court's grant of
partial summary judgment to the defendant cruise company seek-
ing to cap her recovery pursuant to an Athens Convention limita-
tion of liability provision contained in its passage contract.142 The
plaintiffs original claims against the carrier were for wrongful
death under the Death on the High Seas Act, 143 intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, and breach of contract after her hus-
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. The Majestic, 17 S. Ct. 597, 602 (1892).
140. Berman, 1995 A.M.C. at 1929. A lack of information about SDRs contained in
a limitation of liability provision invoking the Athens Convention was a sticking point
for the Ninth Circuit in its decision in Wallis v. Princess Cruises. See infra text
accompanying notes 142-149.
141. 306 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2002).
142. Id. at 829-30. The provision at issue read as follows:
Carrier shall be entitled to any and all liability limitations,
immunities and rights applicable to it under the 'Convention
Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea'
of 1976 ('Athens Convention') which limits the Carrier's liability for
death of or personal injury to a Passenger to no more than the
applicable amount of Special Drawing Rights as defined therein,
and all other limits for damage or loss of personal property. If the
Athens Convention or such exemptions and limitations are held not
to apply for any reason, then all the exemptions from and
limitations of liability provided in or otherwise authorized by the
laws of the United States (including Title 46 U.S. Code Sections
[30501-30509, 305111) will apply.
Id. at 831.
143. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308 (2012).
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band mysteriously fell overboard during a cruise near Greece.'44
After briefly determining the ticket contract provision at issue
passed the first prong of the reasonable communicativeness test,
the Wallis court's analysis dealt chiefly with evaluating the
extrinsic factors surrounding the purchase and retention of the
ticket at issue.'45 The court noted that any passenger who read the
term would need to look up the Athens Convention, research it
and its protocols, figure out what an SDR was, realize that it could
be converted into American currency, and finally discern how to
determine the conversion rate from SDRs to dollars on a given
day.'4 6 The court also thought it unreasonable that the average
passenger would attempt to analyze the conditions under which
the Athens Convention would or would not apply.14 7
Characterizing the burden of this level of research as a disin-
centive to study the provisions of the ticket contract, the court con-
sidered it a relevant extrinsic factor that impeded the passenger's
ability to become meaningfully informed of the terms of their pas-
sage with the defendant.'48 A passenger, according to the Ninth
Circuit in this case, would also require some legal and financial
sophistication to be able to properly comprehend the limitation
sought by the defendant. The Ninth Circuit considered this
requirement a further disincentive for the passenger to familiar-
ize herself with the terms of her ticket contract. 4 9
The Ninth Circuit in Wallis, then, adds depth and substance
to the requirements of the reasonable communicativeness test
defined in Shankles. Instead of holding mere possession of a
ticket contract to be sufficient to notify a passenger of limitations
of carrier liability contained therein, the Ninth Circuit calls for
lower federal courts to analyze such provisions in terms of
whether they pose disincentives for a passenger to become mean-
ingfully informed of their import. An average passenger's need to
conduct extensive research, or to construe legal language or termi-
nology, then, are considered to be disincentives under the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning. Based on the decision in Wallis, what it
means for a passenger to be "meaningfully informed" of limita-
144. Wallis, 306 F.3d at 831-32.
145. Id. at 836-37.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 837 ("We are persuaded that the average passenger has little incentive
to invest sufficient effort to approximate the value of what she would be led to regard
. . . as only a potentially binding term of the Passage Contract.").
148. Id.
149. Id.
2012] 547
548 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:3
tions on carrier liability in a cruise contract is much more than
time and opportunity to read the relevant terms.
Wajnstat v. Oceania Cruises, Inc.1 60
Though not the first time the Southern District of Florida has
decided a case involving a contract provision referencing the Ath-
ens Convention,'"' Wajnstat v. Oceania Cruises, Inc. is the first
controversy requiring a district judge to undergo an analysis of
such a provision according to the requirements of the reasonable
communicativeness test.152 The plaintiff in this case alleged negli-
gent hiring, supervision, and retention on the part of the defen-
dant carrier with regard to its ship's doctor.15 3  Among the
plaintiffs allegations was that a misdiagnosis by the ship's doctor
during a cruise from Istanbul, Turkey to Athens, Greece, resulted
in his needing three abdominal surgeries and extensive hospitali-
zation in a foreign country. 15 4 The subject cruise had no connec-
150. Wajnstat v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., No. 09-21850-Civ-COOKE/TURNOFF (S.D.
Fla. July 12, 2011) (order denying defendant's motion for partial summary
judgment) [hereinafter Wajnstat Summary Judgment Denial].
151. E.g., Ginsberg v. Silversea Cruises Ltd., No. 03-62141-CIV, 2005 WL 5654644
(S.D. Fla. May 17, 2005) (holding the Athens Convention inapplicable under 46 U.S.C.
§ 30509 because the subject cruise departed from Fort Lauderdale, Florida and ended
in New Orleans, Louisiana); Henson v. Seabourn Cruise Line Ltd., Inc., 410 F. Supp.
2d 1246 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (holding the Athens Convention inapplicable to the case
because the cruise itinerary, though never completed, showed the ship was scheduled
to reach a port of the United States).
152. The contract provision at issue in this case read as follows:
Foreign voyages: On cruises which neither embark, disembark nor
call at any U.S. port, Carrier shall be entitled to any and all
liability limitations, immunities and rights applicable to it under
the "Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their
Luggage by Sea" of 1974 as well as the "Protocol to the Convention
Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea"
of 1976 ('Athens Convention'). The Athens Convention limits the
Carrier's liability for death of or personal injury to a Passenger to
no more than 46,666 Special Drawing Rights as defined therein
(approximately U.S. $65,000 which fluctuates, depending on a daily
exchange rate as printed in the Wall Street Journal). On such
cruises, Carrier's liability shall further be subject to the provisions
of the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims,
1976, with revisions, protocols and amendments. In addition, and
on all other cruises, all the exemptions from and limitations of
liability provided in or authorized by the law of the United States
(including Title 46 U.S. Code Sections 30501-30509), [sic] 30511
will apply.
Wajnstat Summary Judgment Denial, supra note 150, at *2-3.
153. Id. at *3.
154. Id. at *1-2.
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tion to the United States, save a forum selection clause contained
in the cruise line's passage contract that required all claimants
file suit in the Southern District of Florida."'
After a relatively brief analysis of the physical characteristics
of the defendant's passage contract, the district court determined
that it passed the first prong of the reasonable communicativeness
test. 6' The district court first made note of the distinction federal
courts have drawn between a passenger's ability to read a passage
contract and his or her ability to understand the terms at issue in
those contracts.5 7 Citing Wallis, the district court held that due to
the problematic structure of the defendant's limitation of liability
provision, as well as its invocation of multiple limits of liability
with no delineation as to when each will or will not apply, the pro-
vision was unenforceable against the plaintiff."' Like the Ninth
Circuit in Wallis, the court in Wajnstat determined that the limi-
tation clause put too heavy a burden on the passenger to research
and construe the Athens Convention.
IV. AFTER WAJNSTAT- POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF AN
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMANCE
Subsequent to the district court's decision, the defendants in
Wajnstat petitioned the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for
interlocutory review.159  The Eleventh Circuit ultimately dis-
missed the defendants' appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reserving
the issue raised on appeal for after the final resolution of the case
in the district court below. 60 Should the Eleventh Circuit eventu-
ally affirm the district court's decision, the implications could
prove significant for the many foreign-owned cruise lines that con-
tractually require that all suits for personal injury be filed in the
Southern District of Florida, and depend on the limitations of lia-
bility included in such contracts.
155. See Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendant Oceania's Motion to
Dismiss First Amended Complaint and Memorandum of Law at IV(D), Wajnstat v.
Oceania Cruises, Inc., No. 09-21850-CIV-Cooke/Bandstra, 2010 WL 3900084 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 2, 2010).
156. Wajnstat Summary Judgment Denial at *6-7.
157. Id. at *9.
158. Id. at *10 ("Although the provision at issue here contains an approximate
currency value for SDRs - thus curing the deficiencies present in Wallis - the
provision nonetheless fails because it did not meaningfully inform the passenger of
what law applies in what circumstances.").
159. Brief for Petitioner, Wajnstat v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 684 F.3d 1153 (11th
Cir. 2011) (No. 11-13670-HH) 2011 WL 6741961.
160. Wajnstat v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 684 F.3d. 1153, 1157 (11th Cir. 2012).
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As noted earlier, with few exceptions, cruise line corporations
(or the corporations that own particular cruise lines) are not incor-
porated in the United States, nor are their ships registered in the
United States or any of its territories.161 Registering ships under
"flags of convenience" is a very common, if not standard, practice
within the shipping and passenger vessel industries.16 2 By regis-
tering a particular ship in any of the "flag of convenience"
nations, 6 3 ship owners benefit from often extremely lax laws.
Nevertheless, the international cruise industry has a substantial
presence in the United States, with many major cruise companies
boasting headquarters in Miami, Florida.164 In 2008, according to
industry sources, passenger cruise lines benefited the U.S. econ-
omy in the amount of $37.9 billion. 65
As it is the most profitable international outlet for passenger
cruises, cruise companies take great pains to protect their inter-
ests in the United States. Protecting against litigation is doubt-
less among the cruise lines' top priorities, as evidenced by the
carefully crafted language in often labyrinthine passage contracts.
After the Ninth Circuit's decision in Wallis, major cruise lines
whose passage contracts contained limitation of liability provi-
sions based in the Athens Convention 6 6 changed the wording of
these provisions to remedy the defect identified in the opinion. 167
161. The Overview: 2011 CLIA Cruise Market Overview, supra note 48.
162. Justin Samuel Wales, Beyond the Sail: The Eleventh Circuit's Thomas
Decision and its Ineffectual Impact on the Life, Work, and Legal Realities of the Cruise
Industry's Foreign Employees, 65 U. MiAmi L. REV. 1215, 1221 (Summer 2011)
(emphasizing that about sixty percent of cruise ships are flagged in either the
Bahamas, Panama, or Liberia).
163. See International Transport Workers' Federation, an international trade
union federation representing the interests of transport workers' unions, for a list of
nations considered "flags of convenience," Listing available at http://www.itfglobal.
org/flags-convenience/flags-convenien-183.cfm (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
164. Carnival, Royal Caribbean, and Norwegian Cruise Lines tout headquarters in
South Florida. These companies combine control over seventy-five percent of the
North American cruise industry. Cruise Lines Int'l Assoc., The Contribution of the
North American Cruise Industry to the U.S. Economy in 2010 (Jun. 2011), http://
www.cruising.org/sites/default/files/pressroom/201OEconomicStudies/EconStudy Full
Report 2010.pdf.
165. About CLIA, Cruise Lines International Association (Sep. 23, 2012 , 3:04 PM),
http://www.cruising.org/regulatory/about-clia.
166. See Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2002).
167. Recall that in Wallis, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant's failure to
provide an approximate monetary limitation when referencing the Athens
Convention in its passage contract does not meaningfully inform a passenger of the
liability limitation, and therefore rendered the provision unenforceable against the
passenger. Wallis, 306 F.3d at 840. At the time of this writing, the relevant portion of
Princess Cruises', the defendant in Wallis, passage contract reads as follows:
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For the time being, Wallis is the only federal Circuit Court of
Appeals decision on the validity of passage contract terms that
seek to limit a cruise line's liability by way of the Athens Conven-
tion. However, the eventual decision from the Eleventh Circuit,
which will likely affirm the district court's ruling, stands to place
additional burdens on cruise companies in drafting and dissemi-
nating the information contained in their ticket contracts. As the
reasonable communicativeness test is firmly engrained in U.S.
law as it pertains to maritime contracts of adhesion, it is likely
that the Eleventh Circuit will focus on the language selected by
the cruise line, as well as the structure of the provision at issue on
appeal to determine whether it requires of an aggrieved passenger
too great a degree of sophistication, legal or otherwise, to discern
how, under what circumstances, and to what extent the cruise line
is able to limit its liability to allegedly injured passengers pursu-
ant to the Athens Convention.
The proceeding portion of this article will focus on issues with
the wording of these passage contract provisions, and will con-
clude with recommendations for drafting more readily enforceable
limitation of liability provisions with an eye to curing the defects
found in the contracts examined in Wallis and Wajnstat.
A. Recommendations
1. Eliminate Reference to the Athens Convention in
Passage Contracts
First and foremost, referencing the Athens Convention by
name in a passage contract seems to be problematic, and is not
entirely necessary. Because the crux of the issue of determining
whether limitation of liability provisions like that in Wajnstat are
reasonably communicative, and not whether the Athens Conven-
tion itself is applicable to passengers, it is likely in the best inter-
est of cruise lines to wholesale eliminate any reference to the
Convention by name. By referring to the Athens Convention, both
"Cruises Outside the U.S.: On cruises which neither embark,
disembark nor call at any U.S. port, Carrier shall be entitled to any
and all liability limitations. . .applicable to it under the. . .[Athens
Convention]. The Athens Convention limits the Carrier's liability
for death of or personal injury to a Passenger to no more than
46,666 Special Drawing Rights as defined therein (approximate
U.S. $70,000 which fluctuates, depending on daily exchange
rate . ). . .."
Passage Contract, Princess Cruises (Sep. 23, 2012, 3:21 PM), http://www.princess.
corn/legal/passage-contract/index.jsp.
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by its colloquial name and its formal international moniker, cruise
companies invite federal courts examining their contracts to look
more closely at the version of the Convention invoked by the pas-
sage contract, as well as subsequent amendments and protocols.168
As the Convention itself is, and has been, a contentious point of
international law, a point that will be apparent to an examining
judge, it is likely not particularly helpful for cruise lines to incor-
porate it by name into their passage contracts. This point is high-
lighted by the attention the Ninth Circuit in Wallis, and the
district court in Wajnstat, gave to the confusion surrounding pas-
sage contracts' incorporation of the Convention, SDR limits and
conversions, and the relation of both to cruise lines' claims of limi-
tations of liability under U.S. federal law.169
Furthermore, through referencing the liability limitation
allowed under the Athens Convention, cruise companies do not
appear to intentionally incorporate the entire Convention into
their passage contracts. Rather, cruise line operators seem to
expressly reference the Athens Conventon in an effort to legiti-
mize the aggressive limits of liability contained in their passage
contracts. Because many of the major cruise lines that refer to the
Athens Convention in order to limit their liability simultaneously
require that all claims for damages be filed in federal courts-
often in one of the U.S. District Courts located in Florida 7 o
cruise lines place themselves in the precarious position of seeking
to apply U.S. federal maritime law, generally favorable to carriers
and shipping companies, while precluding the applicability of 46
U.S.C. § 30501 et seq."' In other words, cruise lines want to have
168. See Wajnstat Summary Judgment Denial, supra note 150, at *10 (stating that
in order to have the opportunity to understand the limitation of liability provision at
issue, the plaintiff would have to research amendments and protocols to the Athens
Convention); see also Wallis, 306 F.3d at 836-37 (asserting that, presumably from
having done so, expecting the average individual to successfully research the Athens
Convention's applicability and inapplicability to their factual situation is unrealistic).
169. See Wajnstat Summary Judgment Denial, supra note 150, at *10-11; Wallis,
306 F.3d 827, 836-37 (9th Cir. 2002).
170. See Cruise Contract, Disney Cruise Line (Sept. 18, 2012) http://disneycruise.
disney.go.com/cruise-contract/?country=us. See also Cruise/Cruisetour Ticket
Contract, Royal Carribean (September 18, 2012) http://www.royalcaribbean.com/
content/enUS/pdf/CTCNotForBR.pdf; see also Cruise Ticket Contract, Costa
(September 18, 2012)http://www.costacruise.conVB2C/USA/Support/contract/contract
.htm; see also Terms and Conditions of Contract of Carriage, Regent Seven Seas
Cruises (September 18, 2012) http://www.rssc.com/media/hostedfiles/legal/JS-
TicketContract.pdf; see also Legal Notice, Silversea Cruises (September 18, 2012)
http://www.silversea.comlegal-notice/.
171. 46 U.S.C. § 30509 (2006) (prohibiting the enforcement of liability limiting
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their cake and eat it too by avoiding U.S. law's prohibition of the
deep limitations of liability allowed by the Athens Convention.
Cruise lines may, based on the more recent federal cases dis-
cussed above, end up facing more resistance than conciliation in
U.S. federal courts when the enforceability of these provisions is
challenged.
Further complicating matters is the fact that the Athens Con-
vention has never been adopted or ratified by the United States, a
fact of which federal district courts are keenly aware. 17 2 Attempt-
ing to enforce the liability limitations provided in the Convention
through reference to them in a passage contract potentially calls
its underlying legitimacy into question. If cruise lines simply
claimed the limitation of liability allowed under the Athens Con-
vention to be applicable to suits brought incident to completely
non-U.S. voyages, without referring to the Convention by name,
there is nothing to suggest that such a term would be any less
enforceable as part of a valid contract than it would be if it
referred to the Convention.
Through avoiding (or at least minimizing) the appearance of
legal cherry-picking, not disallowed but definitely disfavored,
cruise lines stand to eliminate the burden on passengers to
research the Athens Convention held unacceptable in Wallis. At
the same time, cruise lines will also increase the clarity and legiti-
macy of their limitation of liability provisions. Making this
change would therefore improve the likelihood that, in the event
of litigation, the limitation of liability provision would satisfy both
prongs of the reasonable communicativeness test espoused in
Shankles, and therefore be enforced as written. 17 3
2. Remove references to U.S. law from limitation of
liability provisions
A majority of international cruise lines include an additional
layer of potential ambiguity in their passage contracts by reserv-
ing the applicability of 46 U.S.C. § 30501 et seq. in addition to the
limitation contained in the Athens Convention itself.174 Assuming
provisions included in passage contracts provided the voyages such provisions may
apply to come in contact with a port of the United States).
172. See Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions, Inc., 123 F.3d 1287, 1296 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The
United States has not acceded to or ratified the Athens Convention and the
Convention's damage limitations therefore do not apply to actions under United
States maritime law.").
173. Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722 F.2d 861, 866 (1st Cir. 1983).
174. See supra text accompanying note 147. For example, the following text is
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a passenger did read his or her passage contract, invoking U.S.
federal statutes "in addition" to the Athens Convention limit read-
ily gives the impression that U.S. law is just as applicable as the
Convention-exactly the result cruise lines seek to avoid when
invoking the Convention's limits to begin with. Recall that in
Wajnstat, the district court found the layering of multiple and dif-
fering limits of liability both confusing and too burdensome for the
average passenger to decipher."'
A further cause for concern in "stacking" a limitation of liabil-
ity provision applicable only to entirely foreign cruises based in
the Athens Convention (whether referred to by name or not) on
top of a reference to 46 U.S.C. § 30501 et seq. is that the two refer-
ences, upon closer scrutiny, cancel each other out. By the very
terms of § 30509,
"[tihe owner. . ..of a vessel transporting passengers
between ports in the United States, or between a port in
the United States and a port in a foreign country, may not
include in a regulation or contract a provision limit-
ing. . .the liability of the owner. . .for personal injury or
death caused by the negligence or fault of the owner or the
owner's employees or agents...
Reference to § 30509 directly after claiming the liability limit
allowed under the Convention is nonsensical, and confusing-
because the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act only applies to "ves-
sels transporting passengers between ports in the United States,
or between a port in the United States and a port in a foreign
country,""' it necessarily could not apply to any litigation involv-
repeated, almost verbatim, by nearly all of the major cruise companies in their
passage contract's limitation of liability provisions, including by the defendant
company in Wajnstat:
In addition, and on all other cruises, all the exemptions from and
limitations of liability provided in or authorized by the laws of the
United States (including Title 46 U.S. Code Sections 30501-30509,
30511) will apply.
Wajnstat Summary Judgment Denial, supra note 150, at *2-3.
175. Wajnstat Summary Judgment Denial, supra note 150, at *10-11. ("Although
the provision at issue here contains an approximate currency value for SDRs - thus
curing the deficiencies present in Wallis-the provision nonetheless fails because it did
not meaningfully inform the passenger of what law applies in what circumstances....
The passage contract provision at issue here, which references several foreign treaties
and U.S. statutes without delineating when each will apply, does not meaningfully
inform an average passenger about the cruise line's liability limits.").
176. 46 U.S.C. § 30509(a)(1)(A) (2006).
177. Id.
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ing an entirely foreign cruise."' If the goal of such liability limit-
ing contract provisions is enforceability in U.S. federal courts,
according to the precedent found in Wallis and the cases that come
before it, the provision must be reasonably communicative.1 79
Based on the foregoing analysis of relevant case law, the more eas-
ily understood the terms of a maritime passage contract are, the
more likely they will be deemed enforceable by a federal court.80
Therefore, it is difficult to fathom a logical reason why major
cruise lines, which are obviously aware of the requirements of the
reasonable communicativeness line of cases, choose to incorporate
the laws of the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act into sections of
their passage contracts that explicitly apply to foreign voyages.
Cruise lines may be better served, in the event of litigation, either
separating out, or entirely omitting, such references to the Limita-
tion of Liability Act. Either of the above alternatives will ensure,
or at least increase the likelihood of, the enforcement of what
might otherwise be valid limitations of liability.8
178. See Mills v. Renaissance Cruises, Inc., No. C 91-3001 BAC ARB, 1992 WL
471301, at *3 ((N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 1992) ("Congress, in [Sections 30508 and 305091
delimited the reach of American public policy to contracts of passage for voyages that
touch the United States; [it] refuse[s] to supplement that Congressional choice with
judicial embellishment." (citing Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Laureo ed Altri-Gestione, 858
F.2d 905, 915) (3d Cir. 1988))).
179. Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The proper
test of reasonable notice is an analysis of the overall circumstances on a case-by-case
basis, with an examination not only of the ticket itself, but also of any extrinsic factors
indicating the passenger's ability to become meaningfully informed of the contractual
terms at stake." (quoting Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722 F.2d 861, 866 (1st
Cir. 1983)).
180. See Wajnstat Summary Judgment Denial, supra note 150, at *9 ("Cruise
contracts are contracts of adhesion and, as such, ambiguities in them must be
construed against the carrier." (quoting Wallis, 306 F.3d at 838)); see also, e.g., Rams
v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Inc., 17 F.3d 11, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1994).
181. It is also notable that, should a federal court, in the course of litigation, look to
the legislative history of the Limitation of Liability Act, there exists little in the way
of evidence that Congress intended to prohibit the inclusion of limitations of liability
for passenger personal injury or death claims only to voyages that come into contact
with a port of the United States. The bills that resulted in 46 U.S.C. § 183c (now
§ 30509), when discussed by both chambers prior to enactment, show both the House
and the Senate sought to "put a stop to all such practices and practices of a like
character." See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 597 (1991) (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 2517, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1936); S. Rep. No. 2061, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess., 6 (1936)). Though the language of the statute refers directly to voyages that in
some way reach a U.S. port, the time period in which the statute was enacted
suggests that this seemingly geographical distinction was more an acknowledgment
of the U.S.'s limited judicial jurisdiction over wrongs occurring on foreign-flagged
vessels in foreign waters than it was a purposeful exclusion of foreign voyages from
the auspices of U.S. law. See Robert D. Peltz & Lawrence W. Kaye, The Long Reach of
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3. Proposed language for more enforceable liability
limiting provisions
To illustrate the above suggestions, consider the following
provision that was included in the cruise line's passage contract at
issue in Wajnstat, and which has become almost standard lan-
guage used in similar provisions by many major cruise lines:
"Foreign voyages: On cruises which neither embark, dis-
embark nor call at any U.S. port, Carrier shall be entitled
to any and all liability limitations, immunities and rights
applicable to it under the "Convention Relating to the Car-
riage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea" of 1974 as
well as the "Protocol to the Convention Relating to the Car-
riage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea" of 1976
('Athens Convention'). The Athens Convention limits the
Carrier's liability for death of or personal injury to a Pas-
senger to no more than 46,666 Special Drawing Rights as
defined therein (approximately U.S. $65,000 which fluctu-
ates, depending on a daily exchange rate as printed in the
Wall Street Journal). On such cruises, Carrier's liability
shall further be subject to the provisions of the Convention
on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, with
revisions, protocols and amendments. In addition, and on
all other cruises, all the exemptions from and limitations of
liability provided in or authorized by the law of the United
States (including Title 46 U.S. Code Sections 30501-30509),
[sic] 30511 will apply." 18 2
Note, as outlined above, that the cruise line claims all "exemptions
and limitations of liability" as provided in the U.S. Limitation of
Liability Act at the very end of this provision, which itself explic-
itly applies only to "foreign voyages." If the defendant cruise com-
pany separated this language into a separate section of the
contract, perhaps immediately following, with a different heading,
this "stacked" provision would not have been deemed overly con-
fusing for the average passenger to decipher. For example, if the
contract provision read as follows:
"Foreign voyages: On cruises which neither embark, dis-
embark nor call at any U.S. port, Carrier shall be entitled
to any and all liability limitations, immunities and rights
applicable to it under the "Convention Relating to the Car-
riage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea" of 1974 as
U.S. Law Over Crimes Occurring on the High Seas, 20 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 199 (2007-
2008).
182. Wajnstat Summary Judgment Denial, supra note 150, at * 2-3.
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well as the "Protocol to the Convention Relating to the Car-
riage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea" of 1976
('Athens Convention'). The Athens Convention limits the
Carrier's liability for death of or personal injury to a Pas-
senger to no more than 46,666 Special Drawing Rights as
defined therein (approximately U.S. $65,000 which fluctu-
ates, depending on a daily exchange rate as printed in the
Wall Street Journal). On such cruises, Carrier's liability
shall further be subject to the provisions of the Convention
on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, with
revisions, protocols and amendments.
General limitation of liability: On all other cruises, all the
exemptions from and limitations of liability provided in or
authorized by the law of the United States (including Title
46 U.S. Code Sections 30501-30509), [sic] 30511 will apply."
the cruise line's invocation of the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act
would have been more plain, and completely set off from any refer-
ence to the claims made to limitations under the Athens Conven-
tion or other treaty. Recall that in Wajnstat, the district court was
concerned about the average passenger's ability to determine
whether and under what circumstances, based solely on reading
the above provision, that the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act
would and would not apply to their claims based on the concurrent
(in)applicability of the Athens Convention limitation of liability.13
In other words, the district court determined that including a
wholesale reference to the limits under the Limitation of Liability
Act, itself inapplicable to foreign voyages, under a provision
explicitly applicable to foreign voyages, was too unclear and con-
fusing to be enforceable. In the example above, by separating the
reference to the limits that may be available under the Limitation
of Liability Act from any reference to the Athens Convention, a
reviewing court would be more likely to expect a passenger to
understand that the two limits were not necessarily simultane-
ously applicable to subsequent personal injury or wrongful death
claims. This is further accomplished by removing the first clause
"In addition," from the claim to limitation of liability pursuant to
the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act, as illustrated above.
Also as mentioned above, cruise companies might consider
omitting all mention of the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act in the
183. Id. at *10 ("Although the provision at issue here contains an approximate
currency value for SDRs - thus curing the deficiencies present in Wallis - the
provision nonetheless fails because it did not meaningfully inform the passenger of
what law applies in what circumstances.").
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sections of passage contracts that pertain to foreign voyages.
Such a provision would provide:
"Foreign voyages: On cruises which neither embark, dis-
embark nor call at any U.S. port, Carrier shall be entitled
to any and all liability limitations, immunities and rights
applicable to it under the "Convention Relating to the Car-
riage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea" of 1974 as
well as the "Protocol to the Convention Relating to the Car-
riage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea" of 1976
('Athens Convention'). The Athens Convention limits the
Carrier's liability for death of or personal injury to a Pas-
senger to no more than 46,666 Special Drawing Rights as
defined therein (approximately U.S. $65,000 which fluctu-
ates, depending on a daily exchange rate as printed in the
Wall Street Journal). On such cruises, Carrier's liability
shall further be subject to the provisions of the Convention
on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, with
revisions, protocols and amendments."
Contract provisions that resemble the example above would
increase cruise lines' control over exactly what terms would and
would not apply to passenger injury or wrongful death claims inci-
dent to a foreign voyage.
This sort of provision, by removing all reference to U.S. fed-
eral maritime law, would also likely increase the deference with
which a federal court in the United States would treat the con-
tents of the contract term overall. As demonstrated earlier, U.S.
federal courts that have held limitations of liability based on the
Athens Convention enforceable against passengers likely did so
out of respect for the binding nature of contracts, as well as out of
respect for foreign legal instruments like the Athens Conven-
tion.184 The original version of the above provision, by including a
specific reference to limitations under the U.S. Limitation of Lia-
bility Act, encourages a federal court to elevate U.S. law above the
other limitations invoked in the provision, to the exclusion of the
other limitations. This may be so regardless of the fact that limi-
tations under federal law are not available for voyages that never
make contact with a port of the United States. Omitting all men-
tion of the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act in liability limiting pro-
visions applicable to foreign voyages, as illustrated above, could
minimize, or altogether eliminate, the possibility that federal
184. Mills v. Renaissance Cruises, Inc., No. C 91-3001 BAC ARB, 1992 WL 471301,
at *3 ((N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 1992) (citing Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri
Gestoine, 858 F.2d 905,915 (3d Cir. 1988)).
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courts will enforce U.S. law against cruise lines instead of the
preferable limitations claimed pursuant to the Athens
Convention.
Finally, the following draft limitation of liability provision,
based on the discussion of U.S. federal courts' treatment of these
clauses in Wallis and Wajnstat, could prove most enforceable
against passengers. Cruise lines may consider revising the lan-
guage of their limitation of liability provisions as applied to for-
eign voyages to read as follows:
"Foreign voyages: On cruises which neither embark, dis-
embark nor call at any U.S. port, Carrier shall be entitled
to limit its liability for death of or personal injury to a Pas-
senger to no more than 46,666 Special Drawing Rights as
defined therein (approximately U.S. $65,000 which fluctu-
ates, depending on a daily exchange rate as printed in the
Wall Street Journal). On such cruises, Carrier's liability
shall further be subject to the provisions of the Convention
on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, with
revisions, protocols and amendments.
General limitation of liability: On all other cruises, or in the
event of inapplicability of the foregoing limitation, all the
exemptions from and limitations of liability provided in or
authorized by the law of the United States (including Title
46 U.S. Code Sections 30501-30509), [sic] 30511 will apply."
The above suggested language omits any mention of the Athens
Convention by name, and also separates mention of limitations
under the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act from the section per-
taining to foreign voyages. This way, a reviewing court should
view the Athens Convention limitation in Special Drawing Rights
as an "ordinary" contract term, followed by a reference to the U.S.
Limitation of Liability Act as a fail safe rather than an equally
permissible alternative.
Because there is no explicit reference to the Athens Conven-
tion in the above provision, an examining court would be unable to
find the defect present in the contract in Wallis, wherein the
Ninth Circuit held that a passenger should not be expected to
research the Athens Convention. This provision also cures the
other defect set out by the Ninth Circuit in Wallis by explaining
what Special Drawing Rights are, and how they are converted into
U.S. currency. Finally, this provision removes any mention of the
limits that may be available under the U.S. Limitation of Liability
Act from any section that pertains to foreign voyages, so as to be
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mindful of the Act's inapplicability to any voyage not involving a
port of the United States.
If cruise lines adopted the above provision, or similar lan-
guage, passage contracts would avoid the construction issues that
were the cause of confusion for those provisions considered in
prior federal court opinions, especially Wallis and Wajnstat. By
removing the drafting defects discussed above, this new provision
would more easily pass the second prong of the reasonable com-
municativeness test from Shankles. In doing so, the above provi-
sion would better serve the interests of cruise lines, as it would be
more likely to be enforced by an examining federal court of the
United States.
V. CONCLUSION
The Athens Convention was originally enacted to provide a
framework of give-and-take wherein carriers would be allowed to
predictably limit their liability in damages to passengers, while
simultaneously guaranteeing compensation to injured passengers,
where before carriers often contracted out of damages. While
neither its original ratification nor its subsequent protocols and
amendments have been adopted by the United States, the Con-
vention yet stands to affect millions of Americans who embark on
international cruises every year via incorporation into cruise ship
passenger contracts at the discretion of cruise ship companies.
Though cognizant of the benefit and necessity of allowing pas-
senger carriers to limit their liability in the event of catastrophic
accident (rare nowadays) or mass injuries on a vessel, federal
courts in the United States have progressively shifted toward
placing an increased burden on foreign-owned carriers seeking to
do so. This increased burden is found in the ever-narrowing of the
reasonable communicativeness test as applied to cruise line pas-
sage contracts, especially as it pertains to contracts that invoke
international law instruments like the Athens Convention. With
this increased burden in mind, foreign cruise companies seeking
to protect their interests from passenger claims for damages in
U.S. courts should set out to strengthen the enforceability of their
passage contract terms as they apply to wholly-foreign voyages.
By abandoning reference to a treaty with a ratification history as
unsettled and tumultuous as that of the Athens Convention, and
not intermingling U.S. law with liability limits meant to apply
only to foreign voyages, foreign cruise carriers stand to continue to
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reap huge profits from American passengers, while minimizing
potential losses in damages, or worse, negative precedent.
